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1 This issue of Tréma has been conceived to
aim « at questioning the supremacy of the
constructivist  approach  in  the  field  of
physics  teaching »  and  at  opening  the
discussion  to  questions  such  as  the
following:
How has  the  choice  of  the  constructivist
epistemology in this field been justified?
In  particular,  does  the  teaching  strategy
based on the idea of the reconstruction of
knowledge by the pupil necessarily imply
endorsing a constructivist epistemology?
What  are  the  limitations  of  the
constructivist epistemology in the field of
physics teaching?
2 In  this  paper  we  shall  discuss  these  and
other interesting questions, but, first of all,
we  intend  to  show  that  the  supposed
« supremacy  of  the  constructivist
approach » (conceived as the philosophical
constructivist epistemology) in the field of
physics  education is  just  a  myth that  hides the real  challenges to improve students’
learning and attitudes.
 
II. The myth of the supremacy of the constructivist
epistemology in physics education
3 In the most recent Handbook of Research in Science Education (Abell et Lederman, 2007)
we learn that according to the huge bibliography on constructivist-oriented research on
teaching and learning science by Duit (2009), that covers more than 500 single-spaced
pages (!), about 64% of the studies documented are carried out in the domain of physics
(Duit,  Niedderer  et  Schecker,  2007,  p.  599).  In  fact  many  of  the  39  chapters  of  the
Handbook make reference to constructivist perspectives of science learning and teaching
and specifically to the conceptual change tradition, designed as « the one with the longest
history and the most influence within the science education community » (Anderson, C.,
2007, p. 7).
4 Why then do we affirm that the supremacy of the constructivist epistemology in the field
of  physics education is  just  a myth? Ronald Anderson in his  chapter « Inquiry as an
Organizing Theme for Science Curricula » is very clear in this sense: « as used here to
discuss learning, constructivism is not the same constructivism used in discussions of the
nature  of  science »  (Anderson,  R.,  2007,  p.  808).  We  had  already  pointed  out  this
difference (Gil-Pérez et al., 2002) in order to answer the voices that had begun to question
constructivist strategies in science education, speaking, for example, of « Constructivism
Deconstructed » (Suchting, 1992) or of « Rise and Fall of Constructivism » (Solomon, 1994).
5 Why did Suchting, Solomon and others criticize the constructivist strategies for science
learning and what was our defence of these strategies? Let us consider,  for example,
The supremacy of the constructivist approach in the field of physics educatio...
Tréma, 38 | 2014
2
Suchting’s  criticism.  In  his  article  « Constructivism  deconstructed »,  Suchting  (1992)
starts by saying that constructivism is « a doctrine which has for some time been very
influential  in thinking about education […] associated especially with the name of its
originator and principal exponent, Ernst von Glasersfeld ».
6 Without questioning the interest  of  such criticisms as Suchting’s  of  von Glasersfeld’s
philosophical theses, we pointed out that this debate had little to do with constructivist
proposals in the field of science education. In fact, Suchting’s article contains no references
to research in this field, which he appears to be ignorant of, to the extent of considering
von Glasersfeld, whose name only began to be mentioned at the end of the 80’s, as the
« originator ».
7 We insisted (and keep on insisting) on the negligible influence of von Glaserfled and his
philosophical  « radical  constructivism »  in  the  development  of  the  « constructivist
consensus » in science education. Effectively, the first references to von Glasersfeld in
journals such as Science Education, Journal of Research in Science Teaching, Studies in Science
Education or International Journal of Science Education appear in 1988 (Tobin et al.,  1988).
They were very infrequent during the entire decade (three references in the Journal of
Research in Science Teaching, two in Science Education, two in the International Journal of Science
Education and zero in Studies in Science Education). Besides, five of these seven references
came from the same author, namely Kenneth Tobin. The same appraisal of the scarce
influence of von Glasersfeld could be obtained considering the references included in the
handbooks of research on science education published: in the one edited by Gabel (1994)
we found only eight references, four of them coming from the same author (Kenneth
Tobin)  and the other four corresponding to particular details.  In a second handbook
(Fraser et Tobin, 1998) we again found just eight references.
8 And what has happened since then? In the most recent handbook (Abell et Lederman
2007) there is only one reference to von Glasersfeld. We can thus conclude that the debate
put forward by Suchting and other authors (Nola, 1997, Hardy et Taylor, 1997…) is not our
debate.  We  cannot  accept,  as  Suchting  seemed  to,  that  because  we  use  the  word
constructivism  we  are  talking  about  philosophical  constructivism  and  that  we  are
‘applying’ von Glasersfeld’s theses: it is not the same constructivism (Anderson, R., 2007,
p. 808). For this reason, Matthews (1997) wrote: « It is clear that the best of constructivist
pedagogy can be had without constructivist  epistemology ».  In fact  constructivism in
science education has a very different origin. We shall now try to summarise the origin
and nature of what we call constructivism in science education.
 
III. Constructivism consensus in science education
research
9 What is known as the constructivist consensus in science education has its origin in many
specific researches about the different aspects of science education and more specifically
of  physics  education:  from  concept  learning,  problem-solving  or  practical  works  to
evaluation or attitudes towards science… Such research had been undertaken to improve
the poor results of the reception learning paradigm seriously questioned by research on,
for  instance,  « misconceptions »,  « alternative  frameworks »  and,  more generally,
students’ conceptions (Viennot, 1976, Driver et Easley, 1978, Duit, 2009, Scott, Asoko et
Leach, 2007). They had contributed, and continue to contribute, to a coherent body of
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knowledge  which  supports  the  need  to  implicate  pupils  in  the  (re)construction  of
scientific  knowledge  in  order  to  make  possible  a  meaningful  and  lasting  learning,
overcoming the  well  known limitations  of  the  mere  reception of  knowledge  already
elaborated (National Academy of Science, 1995).
10 Constructivism in science education research stands against the transmission/reception
model of science teaching/learning: a model that, in spite of its proven inefficiency, is
still predominant in current physics teaching. We have to distinguish between trends in
science education research and what is done in science teaching: it is true that in fact the
dominating  perspectives  of  research  on  teaching  and  learning  science  have  been
constructivist  views  (Duit,  Niedderer  et  Schecker,  2007,  p.  606),  or  the  very  similar
proposals of the « generative learning model » (Osborne et Wittrok, 1985) and « inquiry
learning » (Anderson, R., 2007, p. 809), which, although they use different terminology,
constitute  proposals  coherent  with  what  we  understand  to  be  the  construction  of
knowledge  in  science  education:  students’  participation  in  the  (re)construction  of
knowledge, acting as novice researchers, with the teachers’ assistance (Gil-Pérez, 1993,
Gil-Pérez  et  Carrascosa,  1994,  Gil-Pérez  et  al.,  2002).  This  assistance  begins  with  the
transformation of the curriculum into programs of activities to orientate pupils’ research
to (re)construct the knowledge and acquire the necessary competencies in the use of this
knowledge (not only conceptual, but procedural and axiological as well). As Driver and
Oldham (1986) have pointed out, from a constructivist point of view the curriculum is
seen not as a body of knowledge or skills but as the programme of activities from which
such knowledge or skills can possibly be acquired or constructed.
11 Notice that we do not speak of pupils as practising scientists working in frontier domains:
this metaphor, used by several authors has, of course, many limitations and cannot give a
useful  view of  how to organise pupils’  learning:  actually,  it  is  obvious that pupils  by
themselves cannot construct all scientific knowledge. The metaphor that contemplates
pupils as novice researchers gives a better appraisal of the learning situation. Effectively,
every researcher knows that when someone joins a research team, he or she can catch up
quite easily with the standard level of the team. And that does not happen by verbal
transmission, but through the treatment of problems in fields where his or her more
experienced colleagues are experts.
12 Summing  up:  The  proposal  to  organise  pupils’  learning  as  a  collective  knowledge
(re)construction corresponds to an oriented research carried on, at the classroom, by
pupils structured in small groups, in fields well known by the « research directors » (the
teachers), and where the partial and embryonic results obtained by pupils’ teams can be
reinforced,  completed  or  even  questioned  and  reoriented  by  those  obtained  by  the
scientific community. This is the constructivism we practice in science education and
strongly recommend to make possible a meaningful learning.
13 But there is little evidence that these views and practices are spreading to large numbers
of teachers (Anderson, C., 2007, p. 13). On the contrary, as the report of the European
Commission « Science  Education  Now:  A  Renewed Pedagogy  for  the  Future  of  Europe »  has
established, whereas the science education community mostly agrees that pedagogical
practices based on inquiry-based methods are more effective, the reality of classroom
practice is that in the majority of European countries these methods are simply not being
implemented (Rocard et al., 2007, executive summary). For this reason, our paper aims at
questioning  the  supremacy,  not  of  the  constructivist  approach  (inexistent  in  usual
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science teaching), but of the transmission/reception approach which is common practice
in the field of physics teaching.
 
III. 1 The supremacy of the transmission /reception model in the
field of physics teaching
14 Researchers in science education generally agree on the central finding about current
school practice: our institutions of formal education do not help most students to learn science
with understanding (Anderson, C., 2007, p. 5). Nor do they help to get them interested in
science, particularly in the field of physics: « physics clearly is the domain that is greeted
with the lowest interest by students among the sciences » (Duit, Niedderer et Schecker,
2007, p. 599). As Aikenhead (2007, p. 885-886) summarizes:
Most research into the science curriculum concluded that school science transmits
content that is socially sterile, impersonal, frustrating, intellectually boring and/or
dismissive of students’ life worlds.
15 Rocard’s Report states the seriousness of the situation:
In  recent  years,  many  studies  have  highlighted  an  alarming  decline  in  young
people’s interest for key science studies and mathematics. Despite the numerous
projects and actions that are being implemented to reverse this trend, the signs of
improvement are still modest [...] the origins of the declining interest among young
people for science studies are found largely in the way science is taught in schools
(Rocard et al., 2007, executive summary).
16 This teaching, based on the mere transmission of knowledge, affects all levels of science
education, including university teaching, as the Bologna Process has shown (online at <
http: //www.ond.vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/bologna/>), and is characterized by an
ensemble  of  distortions  and reductionisms  of  the  nature  of  science  that  need to  be
overcome (Gil-Pérez et  al.,  2002,  Gil-Pérez et  al.,  2005,  Gil-Pérez,  Vilches et  Ferreira-
Gauchia, 2008):
• A socially neutral view of science which ignores (or treats very superficially) the
complex relationship between Science, Technology and Society, STS or, better still,
STSE, adding the E for Environment to direct attention towards the serious problems
of environmental degradation which affect the whole planet. The social context is
ignored (Stinner, 1995), as if science were an activity carried out in ivory towers,
aside from life’s contingencies by solitary geniuses who manage an abstract language
of difficult access. This constitutes a second distortion of scientific activity that we
must contemplate.
• Scientific knowledge appears as the work of isolated « great scientists », ignoring the
role of co-operative work and of exchanges between different research teams. In the
same sense, science is quite frequently presented as a domain only accessible to
especially gifted minorities, therefore conveying negative expectations to the majority
of students, resulting in ethnic, social and sexual discrimination. No special effort is
made to make science meaningful and accessible; on the contrary, the meaning of
scientific knowledge is hidden behind mathematical expressions, without previous
qualitative approaches. Nor is the human nature of scientific activity shown: an
activity where errors and confusion are inevitably part of the process… as happens
with pupils’ learning. The individualistic and elitist image of scientific activity is
made evident in iconographies which usually depict a man in white in an isolated
laboratory, completely surrounded by strange instruments. Thus, we come to a third
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distortion: the one which associates scientific work almost exclusively to work done
in a laboratory, where the scientist observes and experiments in search of a happy
« discovery ». Thereby, an empirical-inductive view of scientific activity is conveyed.
• The idea of experimentation as « the principal route to scientific knowledge » is,
probably, the distortion which has been most studied and which most frequently
appears in the literature (McComas, 1998). It is a conception which enhances
‘neutral’ observation and experimentation, forgetting the important role played by
theoretically founded hypotheses as a guide to research. Although this distorted
view of scientific activity is the most studied and criticised in the literature, many
science teachers continue to adhere to this conception. To understand why, we have
to take into account that, in spite of the importance verbally given to observation
and experimentation, science teaching, in general, is mainly a simple transmission of
knowledge, without real experimental work (beyond some « kitchen recipes »). For
this reason, experimentation is still seen, both by teachers and students, as an
« awaited revolution », as we have observed in interviews with teachers.
Unfortunately, the laboratory practices in school science prevent students, even in
higher education from getting acquainted with the design and implementation of
adequate experiments to test hypotheses, because they typically use designs already
elaborated following kitchen recipes. Thus, science teaching focused on simple
knowledge transmission favours the permanence of empirical-inductive conceptions
which emphasize inaccessible experimental work as a key element of the so-called
« Scientific Method ».
• The « Scientific Method » is presented as a sequence of steps to be mechanically followed,
enhancing quantitative treatments, rigorous control, etc, and forgetting - or even
rejecting  - anything related to invention, creativity, or doubt. In interviews held
with teachers, a majority refers to the « Scientific Method » as a sequence of well
defined steps in which observations and rigorous experiments play a central role and
which contributes to the exactness and objectivity of the results obtained. Such a view
is particularly evident in the evaluation of science education: as Hodson (1992a)
points out, the obsessive preoccupation with avoiding ambiguity and assuring the
reliability of the evaluation process distorts the nature of the scientific approach
itself, initially vague, uncertain, and intuitive. Some teachers, in rejecting this rigid
and dogmatic view of science, may accept an extreme relativism, both
methodological - « anything goes », there are no specific strategies in scientific work
(Feyerabend, 1975)  - and conceptual: there is no objective reality which allows us to
test the validity of scientific construction. « The only basis for scientific knowledge is
the consensus of the research community ». This is a relativism close to the theses of
radical constructivism (von Glasersfeld, 1989), which has received serious criticism
(Suchting, 1992, Matthews, 2000). Nevertheless, the dominant conception is the
simplistic algorithmic one, which, like the related empirical-inductive conception, is
easily accepted in as much as scientific knowledge is presented in a finished form
just to be accepted and learnt: effectively, in this way, neither students nor teachers
have the possibility of putting into practice and realising the limitations of the so-
called Scientific Method. For the same reason one falls easily into an aproblematic and
ahistorical view of scientific activity.
• A teaching orientation based on the simple transmission of knowledge often results
in ignoring the initial problems scientists intended to solve, neglecting the evolution
of such knowledge, the difficulties encountered, the limitations of current scientific
The supremacy of the constructivist approach in the field of physics educatio...
Tréma, 38 | 2014
6
theories or new perspectives. In doing so, one forgets that, as Bachelard (1938)
stated, all knowledge is the answer to a question. The omission of the problem
studied and of the process to construct an answer makes it difficult to perceive the
rationality, relevance and interest of the knowledge constructed and its tentative
character.
• The distorted, impoverished view of science we are discussing here includes two
other misconceptions which both fail to consider that one of the aims of science is
the construction of coherent bodies of knowledge. We are referring to an « 
exclusively analytical » view and to a « linear, cumulative » view of scientific processes.
Why do we speak of an exclusively analytical view as a distortion? It is obvious that
analyses and simplifications are initially necessary, but we should not forget the
subsequent efforts to synthesise and increasingly construct larger bodies of
scientific knowledge, or the treatment of problems which overlap different
disciplines and can be integrated. It is the omission of these syntheses and
integration processes which constitutes a distortion. This is the reason we speak of
an exclusively analytical view.
• The last relevant misconception we have detected consists of the consideration of
the evolution of scientific knowledge as the result of a linear, cumulative
progression (McComas, 1998). This ignores periods of crisis and profound change
(Kuhn, 1970) and the fact that the development of scientific knowledge does not fit
into any well-defined predictable pattern of evolution (Giere, 1988). This
misconception complements, in a certain sense, the rigid and algorithmic view we
have already discussed, although they must be differentiated: while the latter refers
to how a particular piece of research is organised and carried out, the cumulative
view is a simplistic interpretation of the evolution of scientific bodies of knowledge,
which is seen as a linear process. Science teaching reinforces this distortion by
presenting theories in their current state, omitting the process of their construction,
which includes occasional periods of confrontation between contrary theories or
outbreaks of authentic « scientific revolutions » (Kuhn, 1970).
17 These  interrelated  misconceptions  we  have  summarized  transmit  a  socially  accepted
naïve image of science and technology which the transmission/reception model (that
remains prevalent in science teaching) reinforces, sometimes explicitly, but most of the
time implicitly, by omitting the discussion of such erroneous views and, above all, by not
giving pupils the opportunity of getting acquainted with scientific strategies, that is to
say, of engaging in and developing expertise in scientific inquiry and problem solving
(Hodson, 1992b, Gil-Pérez et Carrascosa, 1994, Gil-Pérez et al., 2002, Anderson, R., 2007, p.
807-830).
18 What is being done to change this situation? The answer is not much, according to the
last Handbook of Research on Science Education: « One of the most striking observations
we can offer concerns the extent to which science education research appears not to be
extended and extrapolated to programs of science teacher education » (Russell et Martin,
2007, p. 1151). In other words: « there continues to be a gap between research knowledge
and science teaching practice » (Roth, 2007, p. 1206). In the same vein, Rocard’s Report
recognizes:
The current initiatives in Europe actively pursuing the renewal of science education
through « inquiry based » methods show great promise but are not of the scale to
bring  about  substantial  impact,  and  are  not  able  to  exploit  fully  the  potential
European level support for dissemination and integration.
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 III. 2 What can be done to improve physics teaching and learning?
19 The first thing to do should be to recognize what the problem is: we do not face the
supposed supremacy of the constructivist approach in the field of physics education, but
the  supremacy of  the  transmission/reception  model  that  conveys  a  distorted  and
impoverished image  of  science  and technology  (National  Academy of  Sciences,  1995,
McComas,  1998,  Aikenhead,  2007,  Rocard et  al.,  2007,  Gil-Pérez,  Vilches and Ferreira-
Gauchia, 2008).
20 The second difficulty we have already mentioned is that although abundant research has
shown the potential of an inquiry-learning approach (Anderson, R., 2007, pp. 807-830),
there continues to be a gap between research knowledge and science teaching practice
(Roth, 2007, p. 1206) and even teacher education (Russell et Martin, 2007, p. 1151-1178).
This gap is reinforced by structural constrictions (such as the high number of classes to
teach or the lack of resources available to undertake experimental work) that have to be
eliminated if really we want to improve teaching and learning. But these constrictions
aren’t the only difficulty: it is quite striking to see that even when the number of pupils is
small many teachers continue to lecture as they usually do, without trying to incorporate
more active strategies.
21 One way to close this gap is for teachers to participate in research tasks (Roth, 2007). This
research is necessary, specifically regarding science teacher attitudes and beliefs. Recent
research  on  this  domain  has  revealed  how  individuals’  epistemological  systems  are
constructed through their formal and informal experiences as students. These systems of
conceptions of science nature and science teaching are extremely stable because they
have been modelled for a number of years and the new information is filtered through
them (Jones et Carter, 2007, p. 1067-1104). For this reason science teacher education must
pay special attention to elicit these conceptions and to analyse them in the light of what
the history and philosophy of science show about how scientific knowledge is built (Bell
et  Pearson,  1992,  Désauteles  et  al.,  1993,  Guilbert  et  Meloche,  1993).  In fact,  teachers
understanding and taking into consideration how scientific  knowledge is  constructed
appears  to  be  a  conditio  sine  qua  non –  albeit  insufficient  (Hodson,  1993)  -  for  really
effective science teaching, overcoming the « spontaneous » distorted and impoverished
image of science.
22 For  this  reason  we  have  conceived  a  workshop  which  gives  teachers  the  role  of
researchers who have to critically analyse the image of science and technology usually
transmitted by science teaching. Participation in this oriented research makes it possible
for teachers to begin to overcome their distorted views of the nature of science and
technology and approach current epistemological views (Fernández et al., 2002, Gil-Pérez
et al., 2005). We complete the workshop by synthesizing these epistemological views as a
way of reinforcing teachers’ questioning of the distortions of the nature of science and
technology. Because, in spite of some discrepancies in specific aspects and many nuances,
the views of most contemporary philosophers of science show a basic consensus which
presents an image of science that is radically opposed to the naïve view reflected by the
seven distortions we have discussed in the previous section (Toulmin, 1961, Popper, 1968,
Kuhn,  1970,  Bunge,  1976,  Lakatos,  1970,  Feyerabend,  1975,  Laudan,  1984...).  These are
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some  points  of  consensus  that  we  believe  must  be  enhanced  (Gil-Pérez,  Vilches  et
Ferreira-Gauchia, 2008):
• 1. First of all, we must refer to the general rejection of the idea of the « Scientific
Method » as a sequence of perfectly defined rules to be applied mechanically and
independently of the research domain. The expression (Scientific Method) is
misleading because it may cause us to believe that there is a set of exhaustive and
infallible recipes (Bunge, 1976, McComas, 1998).
• 2. In the second place, we must point out again a general rejection of what Piaget
(1970) denominates « the myth of the sensorial origin of scientific knowledge », that
is, the rejection of an empiricism that conceives knowledge as the result of inductive
inference from « pure data ». These data do not make sense on their own. They have
to be interpreted according to a theoretical system. Thus, for example, when using
an ammeter, one does not observe the intensity of the current, but the movement of
a needle. We have to insist upon the importance of conceptual paradigms, of
theories, in the carrying out of scientific work (Bunge, 1976), which is a complex
process, not reducible to a defined model of scientific development. This may
include breaks and revolutionary changes in the prevailing paradigms and the
emergence of new ones (Kuhn, 1970). We also have to stress that scientific problems
are initially « problematic situations »: the problem is not given, it must be stated in
a precise way, taking decisions to simplify the situation, clarify the aim, etc. And all
of this is done starting from the available body of knowledge (Lakatos, 1970).
• 3. Thirdly, we have to point out the role played by divergent thought and creative
thinking, such as the invention of hypotheses and models or the design of
experiments, neglected in the empiricist-inductivist approach. One does not reason
in terms of certainties based on « facts », but in terms of hypotheses, i.e., « tentative
answers » based on available knowledge, which must be tested as thoroughly as
possible. This results in a complex process in which there are no universal normative
principles for accepting or rejecting a hypothesis and the subsequent changes in the
theoretical corpus (Giere, 1988). Although experimental evidence obtained in
defined and controlled conditions undoubtedly plays an important role in scientific
research, we have to recognise that hypotheses play the central role: we do not
arrive at scientific knowledge by applying an inductive procedure of inference to
previously gathered data, but through the construction of hypotheses as tentative
answers to be tested (Hempel, 1966).
• 4. Another fundamental aspect is the search for coherence (Chalmers, 1990).
Thinking tentatively and working with hypotheses introduces supplementary
demands: we need to systematically doubt the results obtained and the processes
followed to obtain them. This leads to continuous revisions and regulations, trying
to obtain these results using different strategies and, more specifically, testing their
coherence with the whole body of knowledge.
23 It  is  necessary to warn against a possible experimentalist reductionism: experimental
testing is  not sufficient basis  to accept or reject  a hypothesis;  we need to verify the
existence,  or not,  of  the global coherence of these results with the available body of
knowledge.
24 In fact, one of the most important outcomes of science consists in linking apparently
unconnected domains. In a world characterised by diversity and change, science looks to
establish  general  laws  and theories,  applicable  to  the  widest  number  and variety  of
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phenomena. The atomic-molecular theory, the conservation and transformation laws (of
mass,  energy…), the electromagnetic synthesis… are good examples of this search for
coherence and global validity which begins with addressing initially specific and narrow
problems and situations. Scientific development entails this search for generalisations
applicable to real situations. And it is this coherence and applicability to the description
of phenomena, in prediction-making, in the treatment of new situations, etc., which gives
a growing validity –never certainty – to the concepts, laws and theories constructed.
25 We must also be aware that an essential characteristic of the experimental approach is an
explicit  will  to  simplify  and rigorously  control  the studied situation.  This  introduces
artificiality,  which must  not  be  ignored or  hidden:  scientists  decide to  treat  solvable
problems and this causes them to consciously put aside many of the characteristics of the
studied situation, therefore moving away from reality. They also move away from reality
by imagining models and inventing hypotheses. A scientific approach demands, as we see,
artificial, partial and simplified treatments. But this approach should not be seen as a
reductionist and simplistic one: as analyses and simplifications are conscious, scientists
are aware of the need for further syntheses and more profound treatments.
26 We must recognise that this strategy has made the unification of apparently unconnected
fields possible, sometimes with strong ideological resistance, provoking persecution and
damnation as in the well known examples of Heliocentrism and Evolutionism.
27 The history of scientific thought is a permanent confirmation of the validity of these
initially  partial  and  limited  treatments  which  lead  to  the  growing  construction  of
coherent  bodies  of  knowledge  and  to  the  establishment  of  links  between  separate
domains.
• 5. Finally, it is necessary to take into account the social nature of scientific work:
current theories – which constitute the point of departure for the treatment of new
problems –, are due to the contributions of many researchers. Besides, research is
increasingly promoted and controlled by institutions where the work of individuals
is oriented by established lines of research, by teamwork, by sponsors’ interests…
(McComas, 1998).
28 In  fact,  the  stereotype  of  completely  autonomous  research  is  invalid.  The  work  of
scientists,  as  in  any  other  human  activity,  cannot  take  place  outside  society  and  is
affected,  logically,  by  problems,  interests  and  the  circumstances  of  the  historical
moment. And at the same time, the work of scientists influences their physical and social
environments.
29 To remember all this may seem superfluous; but the idea of science as an activity only for
solitary  geniuses,  working  apart  from  the  world,  is  a  stereotype  which  teaching,
unfortunately, does not help to dispel, because it is almost exclusively centred on the
transmission of conceptual knowledge.
30 These  characteristics  of  science  we  have  summarised  may  seem  to  draw  a  vague,
nebulous image of scientific activity, far removed from the idea of a precise and infallible
algorithm, but reveal science in a more authentic and complete light. We could say that
the  essence  of  scientific  strategies  –  putting  aside  any  idea  of  « method »  –  lies  in
overcoming a thought process based on dogmatic securities and common-sense evidence,
in  order  to  adopt  tentative,  hypothetical  reasoning.  Reasoning  which  is  both  more
creative (it is necessary to go beyond what seems obvious and imagine new possibilities)
and more rigorous: it is necessary to construct well founded hypotheses, to test them
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carefully, to systematically doubt the results obtained and to look for global coherence.
These are current points of consensus about the nature of science which draw an image
contrary to the distorted views we referred to in section III. 1.
31 When we present such a summary to the teachers’  teams involved in research about
distorted views of science, they easily point out how this summary overcomes each of the
studied distortions. This reinforces, of course, the clarification efforts made to approach
current epistemological views and achieve a better appreciation of the nature of science
and technology. But, what practical interest could this have? Guilbert and Meloche (1993)
stated,
32 « A better understanding by science teachers in training of how science knowledge is
constructed is  not  just  a  theoretical  debate but  a  highly practical  one ».  In fact,  the
clarification of the possible distortions of the nature of science and technology makes it
possible to move away from the typical reductionism of the activities included in science
teaching and the incorporation of aspects which give a more adequate view of science as
an open and creative activity,  relevant  to the construction of  knowledge and/or the
attainment of technological innovations, capable of satisfying human needs.
33 This strategy aims basically to involve pupils, with the aid and orientation of the teacher,
in  an  open  and  creative  work,  inspired  by  that  of  scientists  and  technicians,  thus
including essential aspects currently ignored in science education, such as the following
(Gil-Pérez et al., 2002 and 2005, Gil-Pérez, Vilches et Ferreira-Gauchia, 2008):
• The discussion of the possible interest and worthiness of studying the situations proposed,
taking into account the STSE implications, in order to make this study meaningful
and prevent students from becoming immersed in the treatment of a situation
without having had the opportunity to form a first motivating idea about it. In this
way pupils, as members of the scientific community, will have the opportunity to
practice decision making about undertaking (or not) a certain research project or
innovation (Aikenhead, 1985).
• The qualitative study of situations, taking decisions - with the help of the necessary
bibliographic research – to define and delimit specific problems. If we want pupils to
really understand what they are doing, it is essential to begin with qualitative and
meaningful approaches… as scientists themselves do.
• The invention of concepts and forming of hypotheses as tentative answers, based on
pupils’ previous knowledge and personal conceptions, which will help to focus the
problems to be studied and orientate their treatment.
• The elaboration and implementation of possible strategies for solving the problems,
including, where appropriate, experimental designs to check hypotheses. It is
necessary to highlight the interest of these designs and the implementation of
experiments which demand (and aid to develop) a multiplicity of knowledge and
skills, including technological work to solve the practical difficulties usually posed
by designs.
• The analysis and communication of the results, comparing them with those obtained by
other pupils’ teams and the scientific community (represented by the teacher and
the textbooks). This can produce cognitive conflicts between different conceptions
and demand auto and inter regulation, that is to say, the formation of new
hypotheses and the reorientation of the research. At the same time this could be the
opportunity to approach the evolution, sometimes dramatic, experimented by the
knowledge accepted by the scientific community. It is particularly important to
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enhance communication as an essential aspect of the collective dimension of
scientific and technological work. This means that students must get acquainted
with reading and writing scientific reports as well as with oral discussions.
• The recapitulation of the work done, connecting new constructions with the body of
knowledge already possessed and paying attention to building bridges between
different scientific domains, which occasionally may generate authentic scientific
revolutions.
• The contemplation of possible perspectives, such as the conception of new problems, or
the realisation and improvement of technological products, which can contribute to
the reinforcement of pupils’ interest.
34 All this allows the application of the new knowledge to a variety of situations to deepen
and  consolidate  it,  putting  special  emphasis  on  the  STSE  relationships  which  frame
scientific  development  and,  even  more,  human  development,  without  forgetting  the
serious  situation  of  planetary  emergency  (Gil-Pérez  et  al.,  2003),  as  international
institutions demand of educators in any area (United Nations, 1992).
35 We would like to highlight that the orientations above do not constitute an algorithm intended
to guide pupils’ activity step by step. Instead, they must be taken as general indications
which  draw  attention  to  essential  aspects  concerning  the  construction  of  scientific
knowledge that  are  not  sufficiently  taken into account  in  science education.  We are
referring both to procedural and to axiological aspects such as STSE relationships (Solbes
et Vilches, 1997, Koballa et Glynn, 2007), decision-making (Aikenhead, 1985, Hart, 2007,
Roberts, 2007), communication (Sutton, 1998, Carlsen, 2007, Kelly, 2007), etc., in order to
make possible a meaningful learning and a better appraisal of scientific activities. This
has nothing to do, as we can see, with the philosophical theses of von Glasersfeld’s radical
constructivism.
 
IV. Conclusion and perspectives: promoting future
scientists’ and citizens’ preparation for decision-
making about socio-techno-scientific issues, an
ethical commitment
36 We  have  tried  to  show  that  the  supposed  « supremacy  of  the  constructivist
epistemology » in the field of physics teaching is just a myth. With this aim, we have
distinguished between trends in science education research and what is done in science
teaching. It is true that the dominating perspectives of research on teaching and learning
science have been the constructivist views, also designed as inquiry-based proposals. But
although pedagogical practices based on inquiry-based methods are more effective, the
reality of classroom practice is that in the majority of classrooms these methods are
simply not being implemented. Supremacy in physics teaching actually corresponds to
the reception learning model, in spite of its proven inefficiency. Tradition and structural
constrictions (as the number and size of  the classes to teach or the scarce time and
resources available for experimental work) contribute to this supremacy.
37 In  addition,  we  have  shown  that  what  we  understand  by  constructivism  in  science
education has nothing to do with the epistemological theses of radical constructivism: it
consists in creating a climate of collective research undertaken by students’ teams, acting
as novice researchers, with the teacher’s assistance. In this way, pupils participate in the
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(re)construction of knowledge, learn more meaningfully and acquire a higher interest in
science (Hodson,  1993,  Gil-Pérez et  al.,  2002,  Anderson,  R.,  2007,  Gil-Pérez,  Vilches et
Ferreira-Gauchia, 2008).
38 We  would  like  to  finish  by  giving  another  important  reason  for  improving  physics
education,  overcoming  the  distortions  and  reductionisms  of  the  nature  of  science
transmitted  by  the  mere  transmission  of  knowledge  already  elaborated:  the  United
Nations General Assembly, given the serious and urgent problems humanity has to face
nowadays,  has  adopted  a  resolution  establishing  a  Decade  of  Education  for  Sustainable
Development (2005-2014). This constitutes a new urgent call to educators of all levels and
areas to contribute to citizens’ awareness and understanding of the situation of planetary
emergency (Bybee, 1991) in order to enable them to participate in well-founded decision-
making and contribute to a sustainable future (Vilches et Gil, 2003).
39 In the opinion of many authors (Fourez, 1994, Bybee, 1997, DeBoer, 2000, Gil-Pérez et
Vilches,  2005,  Koballa  et  Glynn,  2007),  the  preparation  of  citizens  to  participate  in
decision-making justifies scientific and technological literacy as a basic component of
citizens’ education and especially of scientists’ training, in order to revert a degradation
process  that  is  constantly  sending  us  unequivocal  signals  in  form of  global  heating,
unnatural catastrophes, loss of biological and cultural diversity, millions of deaths by
inanition and wars –consequence of suicidal short-sighted interests and fundamentalisms
–,  dramatic migrations… and a long etcetera.  We have to be capable of  generating a
universal trend for a sustainable future that has to begin right now.
40 This is the aim that we can and must incorporate into science education, teaching and
research,  conscious  of  the  difficulties,  but  determined  to  contribute,  as  educators,
scientists  and citizens,  to  build  up the  conditions  necessary  for  a  sustainable  future
(Vilches et Gil, 2003, Hart, 2007). In fact there are many opportunities to incorporate the
state of the world and education for sustainability in physics education. For instance,
studying energy constitutes an excellent opportunity to deal with the world’s situation
and to contribute to a better understanding of the related problems and the possible
action to be taken in light of the current situation of planetary emergency (Furió et al.,
2005). This is for us a very important ethical commitment that justifies in itself the efforts
to improve physics education.
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Cours abrégé de physique : école primaires supérieures, cours complémentaires, préparation au
brevet élémentaire (Programmes de 1920). Chassagny, M., Carré, F., Hachette, Paris, 1922. Source
CEDRHE, 22941, p. 126.
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RÉSUMÉS
Nous essayons de montrer que la prétendue « suprématie de l’épistémologie constructiviste »
dans le domaine de la didactique de la physique n’est  qu’un mythe,  qui  cache la suprématie
effective du modèle inefficace de la transmission/réception. Nous centrons ensuite nos analyses
et propositions sur les défis réels pour améliorer l’apprentissage et les attitudes des étudiants.
We  intend,  first  of  all,  to  show  that  the  supposed  « supremacy  of  the  constructivist
epistemology » in the field of physics teaching is just a myth that hides the actual supremacy of
the ineffective transmission/reception model. We then centre our analyses and proposals on the
real challenges to improve students’ learning and attitudes.
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